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In recent years there has been a spate of interest in Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation 
among social scientists in general, and among labor scholars in particular.1 Nor is this surprising 
since Polanyi warned us of the dangers of what he called the ‘liberal creed’ – belief in the self-
regulating market whose pursuit brought economic misery and cultural devastation to modern 
civilization. Written in 1944 The Great Transformation traces the rise of the self-regulating market – 
the relation between the idea and the practice – from the end of the 18th century, through the 19th 
and into the 20th century generating protectionist counter-movements which brought social 
democracy and the New Deal but also Fascism and Stalinism. The reaction to market 
fundamentalism could be as bad as the curse itself, leading Polanyi to believe that never again would 
humanity indulge in such a dangerous experiment. Yet that is what we now confront.  
 Like Marx, Polanyi could see the downside as well as the potentialities of markets. Indeed, 
there are powerful resonances between Marx and Polanyi – Polanyi draws on Marx’s early writings 
on money and alienation as the basis of his own moral indictment of unregulated commodification. 
But there are also fundamental divergences between their commentaries. Time and again Polanyi 
rails against Marxian theories of history that are based on the law-like dynamics of modes of 
production and their succession through history.  His critique is founded on the claim that 
commodification rather than exploitation is the central experience of capitalism.2 Chapter 13 of The 
Great Transformation undertakes a sustained polemic against the Marxian notion of exploitation, 
which, he claims, actually diminished during the industrial revolution, and therefore cannot grasp 
what was propelling change. According to Polanyi what lay behind the struggles of nineteenth 
century Europe was not exploitation but cultural devastation wrought by the market. In Polanyi’s 
formulation the commodification of land, money and labor – so-called fictitious commodities – 
threatened to destroy ‘society’, the elusive foundation of humanity, and generated spontaneous 
counter-movements to defend society.  In this analysis, classes become effective actors, not in pursuit 
of their own interests, but when they defend the universal interest in sustaining society. The focus, 
therefore, shifts from exploitation to commodification, from production to markets, and from classes 
to society.   
 Polanyi suffers from a false optimism on four counts. First, he so believed in the power of 
ideas that he thought the discredited ideology of market fundamentalism could not take hold of our 
planet again.  Second, he postulated a nebulous and under-theorized notion of society, which, in the 
final analysis, so he claimed, would summon up its own defense in the face of a market onslaught.  
Third, in his hostility to orthodox Marxism – especially toward its theories of history and the 
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centrality of exploitation – he lost sight of the imperatives of capitalist accumulation that lie behind 
the resurgence of markets. Finally, in focusing on the market and its countermovement he too easily 
reduced state to society, missing their complex interplay.  These four elements of false optimism find 
their echo in recent labor studies that, while drawing on Polanyi’s critical ideas of the market, have 
found hope in his postulation of a countermovement.  
 Accordingly, this essay is divided into two parts – two readings of Polanyi. The first part is a 
critique of optimistic renderings of Polanyi, especially renderings that appeal to and search for 
laborist counter-movements to market fundamentalism. As background I begin with some recent 
classics with an optimistic bent before turning to a longer treatment of Grounding Globalization, an 
award-winning book from South Africa. The second part of the essay is intended as an alternative, 
more pessimistic, reading of Polanyi. Locating his analysis of fictitious commodities in historical 
perspective, I seek to understand the peculiar nature of contemporary marketization and thereby 
problematize the possibility of global counter-movement, especially one centered on labor. The essay 
follows on the heels of the excellent articles in the first issue of the Global Labour Journal that dwell 
on the obstacles to labor protest in India and China.    
 
 
 False Optimism 
 There’s no better place to begin than with Peter Evans, whose life-work has been in dialogue 
with Karl Polanyi. For much of his career he studied the political conditions of capital accumulation 
in developing economies, pointing in particular to the role of the state – first the tripartite alliance of 
state, national capital and international capital that produced dependent development in Brazil and 
then in a comparative study of India, South Korea and Brazil that showed how the most effective 
‘developmental’ state, i.e. one that produces economic growth,  is embedded in and autonomous 
from the economy. This corresponds well to Polanyi’s notion of the ‘market’ as a political project 
that requires state regulation and direction.  
 Disturbed by the uneven benefits of capitalist accumulation that he had previously 
championed, Evans turned his attention to the forces that might challenge capitalist inequities. He 
explores Polanyi’s second dimension – the so-called double movement, the countermovement to 
market expansion.3  Here he insists that a counter-movement must go beyond local and national 
levels to reach a global scale – a scale of resistance unanticipated by Polanyi – to produce what he 
calls ‘counter-hegemonic globalization’.  He, therefore, searches for ‘progressive’ social movements 
with the potential to transcend national boundaries – environmental movements, women’s 
movements and above all labor movements – but it is not clear in what way these movements are 
counter-hegemonic, that is to say, in what way they represent an alternative ‘hegemony’, nor what it 
is that they actually ‘counter’, nor that they effectively build transnational solidarity.   
 Evans brings back the state to promote economic development but lets it fly out of the 
window when it comes to organizing struggles – struggles the state confines to the national arena. 
The result is a ‘counter-hegemomic’ globalization which clutches at straws. There’s simply no there 
there. Far from counter-hegemonic, his movements seem to be organized on the terrain and within 
the limits of capitalist hegemony. There is no sign that their ‘small transformations’, or better their 
small perturbations, are more than an adjustment to capitalism.  Important though they are in their 
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own right, they are neither temporally cumulative nor politically (and geographically) connected, 
except perhaps momentarily when they assemble at the World Social Forum. Their activities may 
win the concessions, but they are concessions that forestall rather than prefigure any ‘great 
transformation’.    
 By contrast, Beverly Silver ties labor struggles closely to capital accumulation as it advances 
through space and time.4 Winning concessions does not lead to any ‘great transformation’, but to 
new strategems of capital. Her magisterial account of the history of labor since 1870 shows how 
capitalists compete with one another to drive down the costs of labor, engendering struggles that 
challenge the legitimacy of capital.  Concessions ensue, thereby threatening profits. Capitalism 
lurches between crises of legitimation and crises of profitability, temporarily stabilizing itself with 
various ‘fixes’: spatial fix (relocation to new sources of cheap labor); process fix (technological 
innovation); product fix (turning to a new product or industry where profits are initially high); and, 
finally, financial fix (in which excess capital turns to financial outlets). Silver traces the movement of 
and struggles within textiles, the prototype of 19th century capitalism, and then of the auto industry 
as the prototype of 20th century capitalism, asking what will be the industry of the 21st century.  She 
assumes that labor is always interested in resisting exploitation and its success depends on its capacity, 
that is the mobilization of two types of resources – structural and associational power. She, too, 
reveals an unstated optimism that exploitation always begets what she calls Marx-type struggles, or if 
not these then Polanyi-type struggles around the commodification of labor. In her analysis the latter 
are always a residual category, leaving unelaborated Polanyi’s fundamentally different vision of 
capitalism, his very different theory of experience, and thus the different politics of contestation to 
which it gives rise.   
 Ching Kwan Lee’s canonical text on China’s new and old working class, Against the Law, 
advances Silver’s account.5 She gives equal weight to Marx-type struggles against exploitation by the 
young women who are employed in the electronics industry in the Chinese Sunbelt and to Polanyi-
type livelihood struggles against commodification of the unemployed or underemployed industrial 
workers of the Rustbelt. Lee resolves the tension between Marxian and Polanyian struggles in 
empirical fashion, skirting the underlying theoretical divergences based as they are in very different 
conceptions of capitalism and its future.  Although Lee, interestingly, ties the exploitation of labor in 
the Sunbelt to the partial commodification of land through the redistribution of property rights in 
rural areas, and thus moving in a Polanyian direction of alliances against the market, she makes no 
attempt to move her beleaguered state workers toward international solidarity. Indeed, Chinese 
‘decentralized legal authoritarianism’ locks struggles into local political containers, so that they 
cannot even reach national solidarity let alone build international alliances. 
Gay Seidman thematizes this issue. In her study of transnational consumer boycotts she 
questions the viability of a labor internationalism that does not give voice to labor.6 Instead, she 
emphasizes the continuing importance of struggles to democratize nation states and to improve their 
labor regimes. Here she appeals to Polanyi to justify her focus on the state as a potentially positive 
force, advancing the interests of labor. Like Polanyi, however, she does not examine the relation of 
state and society to understand when the state might protect the interests of labor or when it might 
mount an assault on labor.7 She follows the Nirvana Principle, according to which rejecting one 
solution, ipso facto makes its alternative preferable.8 Just because international solidarity is both 
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infeasible and problematic does not of itself imply that focusing on the state provides any better 
solution. In the contemporary era states have been notoriously hostile to labor.   
Nonetheless, many recent studies do support Seidman’s insistence on the centrality of 
national struggles, successful or not. Thus, in her comparison of labor struggles in South Korea and 
the United States, Jennifer Chun focuses on successful classification struggles that prioritize the link 
between state and labor movement, making international solidarity difficult to accomplish or even 
imagine.9 An interesting variant on this theme is Robyn Rodriguez’s study of transnational migrants 
organized by a Philippine State that brokers deals with other states.10 Here Migrante International, a 
grass roots movement of migrant workers, does organize transnationally – not by building relations 
with workers from other countries but by focusing its demands on the Philippine State. Hers is the 
exception that proves the rule. Once again the state frames and limits the context of struggle. All 
these studies, and many others too, call attention to an untheorized dimension in Polanyi – his 
tendency to reduce state to society – and how labor is locked into an interdependent and 




 From the point of view of surfacing the limitations of Polanyi and the tensions with Marx 
one of the most interesting books to appear recently is Edward Webster, Rob Lambert and Andries 
Bezuidenhout’s (WLB), Grounding Globalization, which compares the responses of labor in three 
white goods factories, namely LG in South Korea (Changwon), Electrolux in Australia (Orange), 
and Defy in South Africa (Ezakheni).11 There’s no doubt about the importance of the book in 
focusing on the experiences of workers beyond the workplace, and placing them within an overall 
societal context. The comparative analysis among countries is important. But their political desires 
overwhelm their analysis when they claim to see in their case studies movements – Marxian and 
Polanyian – thwarting the tide of neoliberalism. The counter-movement becomes a mirage, a fantasy 
that disavows their intention to ground globalization.   
 The book opens with a most promising engagement with the ‘Polanyi Problem and the 
Problem with Polanyi’, posing five questions about society and the countermovement.  (1) What is 
this society that spontaneously defends itself against the market? (2) What is the nature of the 
counter-movement to marketization? What reacts and under what conditions? (3) What place if any 
has labor in the counter-movement? (4) How should we conceptualize power in the double-
movement, what sources of power can the movement draw upon? (5) At what scale should we think 
of the counter-movement – local, national or global?  The trouble is that the third part of Grounding 
Globalization turns away from these questions, abandoning its original design as an excavator, 
digging in the trenches of society and exploring the lived experience of insecurity.     
 Let me be clear. The book is elegantly organized along Polanyian lines. Part I: Markets 
Against Society; Part II: Society Against Markets; Part III: Society Governing the Market? Thus, in 
Part I we are treated to a study of globalization for its real but different consequences – broadly 
speaking, consent to capitalism, leading to work intensification in South Korea; threatened closures 
in Australia; and livelihood strategies of survival in South Africa. In Part II WLB identify the 
following societal responses to capitalism: in Changwon the clandestine organization of a branch of 
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the National Labor Federation (KCTU), and the creation of a Center for Contingency workers; in 
Orange, a campaign against plant closure, involving an alliance of labor and farmers, support for an 
independent political candidate, and an unsuccessful attempt to link communities affected by 
closure within a global Network of Electrolux Action Committees; in Ezakheni they claim a social 
movement unionism that linked struggles for land and labor, an open budgeting experiment at the 











MARKETIZATION North: Rapid Marketization and 
commodification 
South: Colonial Conquest and land 
dispossession 
North: Rapid liberalization  
 
South: Structural Adjustment 
PRODUCTION REGIME North: Market despotism in the 
workplace 
South: Colonial despotism 
North: Shift to hegemonic despotism 
 
South: Market despotism 
COUNTERMOVEMENT North: Emergence of workplace 
hegemony and construction of 
welfare state 
South: National Liberation 
Movement, leading to political 
independence and state corporatism 
 
North and South : Embryonic global 
countermovement in the post-Seattle 
period – WSF, new global unionism 
 
Source: based on Tables 3.1 (p. 53) and 3.2 (p. 55) in Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout (2008) 




 This analysis portends significant insight into society – its meaning, its resilience, its defense, 
its relation to the state, but that’s not what we get in Part III, ‘Society Governing the Market’.  As we 
see in Table 1 above, WLB conjure up the essential elements of a Second Great Transformation, by 
contrasting it with Polanyi’s account of counter-movements in England in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, the First Great Transformation. Here again we have postulated an ‘embryonic global 
countermovement’, but what’s the evidence for its existence? Here again we have a Polanyian 
teleology: a malignant past is first homogenized and then inverted into a radiant future. This false 
homogenization of history but also of geography (the dichotomous north-south distinction), 
becomes a flight of fancy into labor internationalism and utopian society – the one a Marxian dream, 
the other a Polanyian dream. Let us deal with each it turn.    
 WLB draw out two forms of labor internationalism, an old and a new. On the one hand, 
there was the labor internationalism, run by career bureaucrats operating in a centralized hierarchical 
organization, with restricted debate and a diplomatic orientation, focused only on workplace and 
trade unions, established by Northern male white workers. On the other hand, today, we have the 
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promise of a new labor internationalism driven by a political generation of committed activists, 
linked by decentralized networks, engaged in open debate, with a mobilizational and campaign 
orientation, focused on coalition building with new social movements and NGOs, dominated by 
workers from Southern Africa, Asia and Latin America.  
 What are the foundations of this new labor internationalism? We are presented with the 
discursive maneuvers of SIGTUR (Southern Initiative on Globalization and Trade Union Rights), 
but what have they to do with the workers of Ezakheni, Orange and Changwon?  Surely, if we are to 
think about labor internationalism we need to think through the experience of work in these 
factories (about which in the final analysis we do not learn a great deal), the lateral connections 
between workplaces, both the connections of interdependence (e.g. the role of outsourcing) and the 
relations of solidarity (built through common struggles). We need to look at the commodity chain 
and its weak links, but also the possibility of building ties with other fractions of the workforce that 
are not connected to the white goods industry. If, on the one hand, we need to have a deeper 
comprehension of the lived experience of insecurity, on the other hand we need a far more 
elaborated interrogation of the nature of ‘neoliberalism’. We need to examine the forces behind the 
restructuring of the white goods industry globally, and the obstacles this creates for any industry 
based organizing. Yes, manufacturing may still matter, but what’s the basis for thinking that 
industrial sector is the appropriate unit for organizing? Are WLB shining their torch in the right 
place?   
 WLB are good at moving vertically, locating the experience and response to neoliberalism 
within their national contexts, but they don’t explain why these national contexts do not become a 
steel frame that shuts out possibilities of labor solidarity within countries let alone between countries. 
Could it be, as Seidman argues, that labor internationalism may undermine the very national 
projects that have greater promise of success? In South Africa, for example, as Webster et al. know 
only too well, the trade union movement is on the defensive, losing jobs to foreign lands and to the 
informal sector. Should unions, who represent wage labor, a shrinking labor aristocracy, be building 
ties with unions in other countries, or creating broader solidarities with informal sector workers in 
South Africa? Should the metal workers be concerned about labor brokers exploiting the national 
labor market, or should they be helping to defend workers against plant closures in the United 
States? Whatever unions should be doing, the workers described in Grounding Globalization seem to 
be largely trapped in localism. 
 If the Marxian dream of internationalism is dashed on the rocks of localism, what is the fate 
of the Polanyian societal counter-movement? Here WLB talk of a new vision of nature and of work, 
of the socially responsible corporation, of an active democratic society, of a new fair trade system, of 
a new global politics. As a manifesto for a new world it has little to do with labor in the age of 
insecurity, at least, on the evidence of the book’s forgoing chapters.  
 Finally, between the alternative worlds of internationalism and counter-movement there is 
an unexplored tension. On the one hand, there is the Marxian project of labor internationalism that 
tries to link working classes across factories, localities, nations, regions and the world, united by their 
common exploitation. On the other hand, there is the Polanyian scheme which unites participants in 
a counter-movement against the commodification of land, money and labor, a counter-movement 
based on experience of the market as distinct from experience of production. But which is the most 
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salient experience – exploitation which potentially brings together workers as wage laborers across 
geographical scale or commodification which brings together workers, expropriated farmers, people 
struggling for access to water and electricity?  
 Where one sits in relation to this question – exploitation vs. commodification – will dictate 
the strategy one deploys in moving forward: building alliances of workers across national boundaries 
or local alliances among those suffering from commodification. Whichever project we follow – and 
they are both deeply problematic – our theoretical frameworks need to dwell on the obstacles to 
contestation rather than on embryonic global countermovement or counter-hegemonic 
globalization. We first need a more realistic analysis of production and marketization on a world 
scale in order to discern chinks in the capitalist armor, before celebrating internationalism or 




 This second part of the paper offers a preliminary sketch of a different rendering of Polanyi – 
an historicized account of capitalist globalization that centers on the commodification of labor, 
money and nature and their inter-relations. The argument is premised on commodification being 
the key experience in our world today, and that exploitation, while essential to any analysis of 
capitalism, is not experienced as such.12   
 My point of departure is Polanyi’s failure to anticipate a subsequent round of market 
fundamentalism. Humanity had learned its lesson, he claimed, the self-regulating market had 
brought disaster to all.  So it was not something that would ever be repeated. He couldn’t have been 
further from the truth. Beginning in the 1970s with the oil crisis, humanity has faced another wave 
of marketization that has brought devastation but, with some interesting exceptions, no real 
significant counter-movement, at least so far. Why did Polanyi not anticipate another wave of 
marketization? My argument is that in rejecting Marxism, he rejected the very idea of capitalism 
with its imperatives for accumulation and new sources of profit. The re-embedding of markets in the 
North, during the postwar period, was costly for capital, which responded with an offensive against 
labor, the environment and money, all in the endless pursuit of profit.13   
 This renewed marketization creates profound problems for Polanyi’s conceptualization of 
history. Like the Marxism he criticizes, he has his own teleology. The Great Transformation reduces a 
complex historical account to a single cycle: market devastation followed by counter-movement and 
regulated decommodification. Once this teleology doesn’t work, once the relegation of evil to the 
past and good to the future is rejected, then one can see the history of capitalism as a succession of 
great transformations and a complex intertwining of marketization and counter-movement, but with 
no definite end in sight. Even following Polanyi’s own account we can discern, at least, two distinct 
waves of marketization, and two great transformations between the end of the 18th century and the 
middle of the 20th century.  
 In Polanyi’s history of Britain, the first wave of marketization is marked by the attack on the 
Speenhamland system, introduced in 1795 to subsidize wages with grants tied to the price of bread, 
a gross interference with the working of the labor market that was finally lifted in 1834 with the 
New Poor Law that eliminated outdoor relief. From then on labor became an actor on its own 
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behalf, fighting against its commodification. In the beginning working class struggles, such as 
Chartism, were unsuccessful but when labor relinquished its radical bite in the latter half of the 
century and especially after the depression (1873-76) it gained decommodifying concessions – 
recognition of trade unions, reduction of the length of the working day, child labor laws, 
unemployment compensation and even the beginning of pensions. This was the First Great 
Transformation.  
 After World War I, marketization develops a second wind through international trade 
governed by the gold standard along with a renewed assault on the labor movement, insurgent in 
many European countries in the immediate aftermath of the war. The counter-movement that 
spread across Europe and North America through the 1930s and afterwards, first moved to 
decommodify money by insulating national currencies and then built the social protection of labor 
in diverse forms of political regime – from fascism to Stalinism, from New Deal to Social 
Democracy. This Second Great Transformation of welfare capitalism as well as the international 
monetary system organized under Bretton Woods saw to the regulation of the market. It was also the 
period of decolonization followed by state directed development in Africa and Asia. It was the period 
of uncontested state planning in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China. Throughout the 
world the marketeers were in hiding and on the defensive. It was widely assumed that the market 
had to be regulated in the societal interest. This takes us up to the 1970s, whereupon an 
extraordinary reversal took place – market panaceas asserted themselves in the Thatcher and Reagan 
ideological revolutions, in the Washington Consensus, in structural adjustment, and in reform 
communism and finally in communism’s collapse. Thus, state regulation gave way to a third wave of 
marketization in the middle 1970s, following the oil crisis. 
 What can we say about this third wave of marketization and the possibilities of a Third Great 
Transformation? In this heuristic model each successive wave of marketization is characterized by a 
new combination of fictitious commodities. In the first wave the (de)commodification of labor takes 
the lead, in the second wave we see the intersection of the (de)commodification of labor and money 
with money taking the lead. The third wave is characterized by the articulation of the 
(de)commodification of labor, money and nature, in which the (de)commodification of nature will 
ultimately take the lead. Figure 1 presents a graph of the three waves, with speculative dotted lines 
indicating possible futures.  
 So far the third wave has delivered new and wild forms of the commodification of money, 
turning it from a medium of exchange into a tool of profit making, based in derivatives, futures, and 
securitization of loans, and operating through hedge funds largely outside the control of states. This 
has brought with it a renewed recommodification of labor – a retreat from the commodification of 
labor power – together with a destructive decommodification of labor as it is pushed out of wage 
labor into the informal sector. Increasingly, exploitation is a privilege rather than a curse, especially 
in the South but also in the North with growing unemployment and underemployment. The fall of 
communism in 1989 and 1991, and the financial crises in Latin America, Asia and finally reaching 
the shores of the US in 2008 have only consolidated third-wave marketization which, so far, in many 
ways does look similar to the second wave of marketization. Indeed, we can even see parallel state 
responses, whether in the form of Islamic and Socialist revivals that can be seen as attempts to 
regulate markets in the Middle East and Latin America, or the austerity programs that are spreading 
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through Europe, especially in its peripheries. Writing in the first issue of the Global Labor Journal, 









Second Wave  
(1914-1974) 
Third Wave 




























                     1873-76 
1795 
 
















                        













     
    2008 




 The true character of third-wave marketization, however, has still to be stamped with the 
deepening commodification of nature, that is of land, water and air. This is, of course, already 
proceeding apace, all over the world, most visibly in the semi-periphery in countries such as South 
Africa, China, India, Brazil. Land expropriation can be found in most of the South, perhaps 
nowhere more dramatic than in India. In reaction to second-wave marketization we find the era of 
state-led Nehruvian modernization, the expropriation of land without commodification (most 
notoriously for the construction of dams), while third-wave marketization has brought in its train 
expropriation with commodification, epitomized by Special Economic Zones.15 Elsewhere, for 
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example in countries as far apart as South Africa and Bolivia, the commodification of water and 
electricity has attracted much popular protest, while the commodification of air through carbon 
trading has brought the environment into public attention throughout the world.  
 These commodifications of nature have a dramatic impact on survival and, thus, on the 
commodification of labor. Privatizing water or land puts more pressure on the demand for wage 
labor, intensifying its subjugation. New instruments of finance facilitate the unregulated 
commodification of energy supplies, illustrated in the operation of Enron, again outside the control 
of the state. We might speculate that the crisis of third-wave marketization will develop through 
successive environmental crises generated by unnatural disasters – climate change, tsunamis, 
earthquakes, oil spills, nuclear accidents, toxic waste – unnatural in either their origins as well as 
their consequences. 
 The heuristic model presented in the graph above shows a deepening of successive waves of 
marketization and a more dramatic restructuring that follows in part due to the intensification of 
commodification, but also due to the forms of and synergies among the commodification of 
different fictitious commodities. The graph raises the question of whether there are candidates for 
fictitious commodity other than nature, labor and money. Could ‘knowledge’ be a fictitious 
commodity as some have argued? For Polanyi a fictitious commodity is an essential factor of 
production which was never meant to be commodified and whose commodification destroys its 
essential character. In brief, we might say that a fictitious commodity is one which, by turning it into 
an object of exchange undermines its use value. Turning land into a commodity destroys the 
community which lives on and from it, turning labor into a commodity destroys its productive 
capacity, turning money into a commodity threatens its use as a medium of exchange. But 
knowledge? What happens to its use value when it becomes an object of exchange? Certainly, when 
knowledge is commodified, bought and sold, it is no longer a public good. It becomes intellectual 
property, privately owned, but does that change its character? Intellectual property rights may have 
led to the transformation of the production of knowledge, geared to those who can afford to pay for 
it, but does that distort it? One might argue that market pressures are driving universities to 
collaborative relations with industry that are at odds with their original purpose, but does that make 
knowledge a fourth fictitious commodity?16  
 As it stands this scheme assumes waves of marketization spreading throughout the world, 
transformative of the South as well as of the North. Even if such claims can be made the scheme 
does not recognize the differential impact of such marketization on different geopolitical regions.  
The Great Transformation focuses largely on England in the first wave of marketization, extending 
this to Europe in the second wave marketization, and today there is no alternative but to include the 
whole planet, which in turn compels us to also situate Polanyi’s analysis of the first two waves and 
their counter-movements globally. While Polanyi does write about colonialism in South Africa as an 
extreme form of cultural devastation brought on by marketization, he actually misses the limits of 
and resistance to the commodification of land, labor and money and the specificity of first and 
second wave-marketization in the colonial world. A preliminary step would recognize the distinction 
between core and periphery in which the colonial periphery becomes a source of raw materials that 
entails the partial commodification of land and labor. Then, second-wave marketization can be 
characterized as imperialism in which the relations of core and periphery continue to revolve around 
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access to raw materials, but now also revolve around crises of overproduction in the core requiring 
market access to the periphery. Just as the counter-movements in Europe and North America 
invoked state autonomy and regulation of the market, so correspondingly we can see decolonization, 
and the national development projects that followed, as counter-movements in the periphery, 
leading to dependency orchestrated through trade.  
 How then can we characterize third-wave marketization in global terms? We can call it the 
era of globalization in which the commodification of labor, money and nature – labor migration, 
finance capital as well as environmental degradation – for the first time takes on a truly transnational 
character that is often outside the control of the state. But third-wave marketization, coming on the 
heels of the Second Great Transformation that centered state regulation, has very different effects 
depending on national legacies and national strategies. Thus, the Soviet Union, capitulating before 
third-wave marketization, took the market road to market capitalism. With wanton destruction of 
the state and the planned economy, Russia’s newly formed dominant class hoped that capitalism 
would spring fully-formed out of the ashes of state socialism. If capitalism emerged, it was capitalism 
of a very special type in which the expansion of the realm of exchange and an unregulated 
commodification of money destroyed the industrial economy, forcing labor into a reliance on 
subsistence. This was not revolution or evolution but involution.  
 What sort of counter-movement was this? Certainly, it was nothing like 19th century 
England or even 20th century Europe. This was a retreat to a pre-capitalist economy as Polanyi 
would describe it, a retreat from money to barter, retreat from wage labor to domestic production 
based on reciprocity, a retreat from collective farms to peasant production. In China, by contrast, 
third-wave marketization was strongly mediated by the state. There was no attempt to destroy the 
state but rather to incubate the market within the interstices of the state. The Chinese dominant 
classes had learned the Polanyian lesson that market society requires state regulation. To be sure it 
has been accompanied by the growth of inequalities, but, so far, ‘cellular’ social protest has been 
effectively absorbed by the state as opportunities to exploit the market have multiplied.17                              
 That being the case what possibilities are there for the counter-movement to third-wave 
marketization? If the counter-movement to the first wave starts out from the local and reaches the 
national and the countermovement to the second wave starts out at the national and reaches for the 
global, the countermovement to the third wave must begin at the global level for it is only at that 
level that it is possible to contest the destruction of nature, let alone tackle the global machinations 
of finance capital. Although the effects of the degradation of the environment will be uneven and 
unequal, ultimately all will be affected, rich and poor, north and south. Some sort of global counter-
movement may be necessary for human survival, but there is no historical necessity for it to appear. 
It has to overcome deep-seated geopolitical, but especially national containers as well as temporal 
constraints, especially the short time horizons engineered by marketization. A counter-movement to 
prevent ecological disaster would require immediate sacrifices for long term and uncertain gains. 
Perhaps long time horizons can only be imposed by authoritarian rule – the Polanyian nightmare of 
global fascism. There may be small counter-movements, small rather than great transformations, 
mopping up operations after every (un)natural disaster, but it is not clear how a succession of small 
transformations will turn into a great transformation. To the contrary, palliative care might forestall 
any collective commitment to contain capitalism’s rapacious tendencies. The choice may no longer 
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be limited to ‘socialism or barbarism’, but be extended to socialism or barbarism or death. Optimism 
today has to be countered by an uncompromising pessimism, not an alarmism but a careful and 
detailed analysis of the way capitalism combines the commodification of nature, money and labor, 
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